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Bad Holocaust Art 
Abstract 
This article examines the representation of the Holocaust in the visual arts, and evaluates theories of that 
representation which seek to place limits upon artworks that are seen to transgress responsible modes. 
Acknowledging that the Holocaust is one of the most fraught and contested of crime scenes, it opens by 
studying the public responses to the Mirroring Evil exhibition, at the Jewish Museum in New York in 2002. 
It traces changing critical and theoretical discourses about the limits of Holocaust representation, and 
tests these against practices in literature, historiography, jurisprudence and visual art. In particular, it 
describes the transgressive goals of certain practices within contemporary visual art, and proposes an 
ethical framework for engaging with various forms of transgressive conduct. 
This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol13/iss1/11 
226
Biber
Figure 1. Tom Sachs, Giftgas Giftset, 1998
cardboard, ink, adhesive, foam. 35 x 44 x 12 in.  
Image courtesy of the artist
Figure 2. Tom Sachs, Prada Deathcamp, 1998
cardboard, ink. adhesive. 27.25 x 27.25 x 2 in.  
Image courtesy of the artist




You must find the proper place for everything you see but you’ ll never get 
to make a lampshade out of me.
– Elvis Costello and the Attractions, ‘Goon Squad’1
In 2002 the Jewish Museum in New York exhibited Mirroring Evil, 
in which contemporary artists represented the Holocaust. Holocaust 
survivors demonstrated against the exhibition, holding placards in 
the street outside. An 81 year old survivor of Buchenwald, Isaac Leo 
Kram, carried a sign that read: ‘I was there. I testify: Genocide is not 
art!’ (Kershaw 2002). A sign at the entrance of the museum warned 
visitors that some might be upset by the exhibition. The New York 
press, typically supportive of the city’s art institutions when attacked by 
critics, repeatedly questioned the Museum’s judgment in holding the 
exhibition. At the heart of the controversy was grave concern that some 
of the artworks were testing the limits of how the Holocaust could be 
represented and remembered. Some of the artists, challenging long-
standing conventions about Holocaust memory, tested whether it was 
possible to employ irony, satire and pastiche, and whether the perspectives 
of Holocaust perpetrators could be included. As the most historically 
loaded of crime scenes, the Holocaust continues to bear the weight of 
responsibility for its own representation, its own memorialisation; the 
Holocaust continues to police its own status as history’s most traumatic 
crime scene. Artists, filmmakers, writers and scholars continue to learn 
that the Holocaust does not invite itself to be looked at with fresh eyes. 
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Representations of Holocaust crimes that are somehow ‘new’ or ‘creative’ 
or ‘challenging’ invite criticism, sanction, and repeated calls for silence. 
Holocaust representation is a field contained within strict limits; certain 
imaginings are said to be off-limits. Yet contemporary artists, almost 
by nature, are motivated to test limits. Whether engaged in cultural 
provocation or deeper meditation about genocide and its memory, 
Mirroring Evil offered a forum for contemporary artists and their curators 
to confront the traditional limits imposed upon Holocaust representation 
by an earlier generation of survivors and scholars. This article examines 
certain visual practices to see how history, memory and responsibility 
operate in the visual remembrance of the Holocaust’s crimes. It reveals 
the difficulty of balancing historical, ethical and moral values against 
artistic aspirations. It argues that, whilst certain aesthetical practices 
may be ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’, we need to exercise caution before claiming that 
bad practices are equally bad, or that poor artistic judgment is as wrong 
as criminal conduct.
Exhibited in Mirroring Evil, Alan Schechner’s work ‘It’s the Real 
Thing – Self-Portrait at Buchenwald’ (1993) appropriates the famous 
1945 Margaret Bourke-White photograph of starving male inmates 
crowded into their bunks, all looking at the camera (see Figure 3). 
Schechner super-imposed a photograph of himself into the foreground, 
wearing a striped prison shirt and holding a can of Diet Coke. Only 
the Coke can is in colour, and illuminated in shining light. Zbigniew 
Libera, in ‘LEGO Concentration Camp Set’ (1996) displayed a series 
of modified LEGO boxes containing the pieces needed to build a 
concentration camp, a death chamber and torture facilities (see Figures 
4-8). It includes black-helmeted soldiers and white, skeletal, smiling 
victims. Both works interfere with the expectation that, when dealing 
with Holocaust crimes, we need to be serious. At the centre of all 
Holocaust discourse is the duty to be responsible; responsibility is the 
hard kernel at the heart of every Holocaust representation. There can 
be no idle chatter, no playful irreverence about the Final Solution; 
everything speaks. For that reason, one line of critical thought argues 




Figure 3. Alan Schechner
It's the Real Thing - Self-Portrait at Buchenwald, 1993
Digital still. www.dottycommies.com. Internet project 
Image courtesy of the artist
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Figure 4. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
studio photograph, 20 x 30cm 
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three. 
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
Figure 5. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996,
brick set (box detail),  
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three. 
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
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Figure 6. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
studio photograph, 20 x 30cm 
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three. 
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
Figure 7. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
box design, archive material, 28 x 27cm 
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three. 
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
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Figure 8. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
box design, archive material, 78 x 71.5cm 
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three. 
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
Ernst van Alphen wrote that ‘Holocaust survivors and new 
generations after the Holocaust have a special responsibility towards its 
historical events’ (2001: 45, emphasis added). Hayden White asked, ‘Are 
there any limits on the kind of story that can responsibly be told about 
these phenomena?’ (1992: 37, emphasis added). James R. Watson (1992) 
warned us about the perils of failing to impose limits. Concurring with 
Jürgen Habermas, he wrote of the necessity for ‘critical intellectual 
activity’ to identify and police the limitations of the human conditions 
(1992: 171-2). Failure to do so would allow the unimpeded perpetuation 
of the ‘almost autonomous economic system’ whose ‘rampant reduction 
of everything and everyone to a resource in the self-destructive frenzy 
of consumption’ enabled ‘State organized mass murder’ (Watson 1992: 
171-2). The development of institutions which set limits upon this 
murderous autonomy needs to be supported, he argued, and the failure 
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of art and philosophy to defend those limits is a ‘delusional intellectual 
pretension’ (Watson 1992: 172). Without limits, this argument claims, 
the Holocaust is always imaginable, possible and repeatable.
Yet the artwork of Tom Sachs, represented in the Mirroring 
Evil exhibition, skips blithely — even obliviously — through this 
representational minefield. His work ‘Giftgas, Giftset’ (1998) contains 
three dented cylinders labeled as containing Zyklon B, each wrapped 
as gifts using the colours and typeface from the Chanel, Hermes and 
Tiffany & Co. labels (see Figure 1). Another work, ‘Prada Deathcamp’ 
(1998) is a 27-inch model of a concentration camp made from a 
deconstructed Prada hat box, ink and wire (see Figure 2). Sachs was 
interviewed in the New York Times about these works:
Sachs: I’m using the iconography of the Holocaust to bring 
attention to fashion. Fashion, like fascism, is about 
loss of identity. Fashion is good when it helps you to 
look sexy, but it’s bad when it makes you feel stupid 
or fat because you don’t have a Gucci dog bowl and 
your best friend has one.
Q: How can you, as a presumably sane person, use the 
Nazi death camps as a metaphor for the more coercive 
aspects of the fashion industry? It makes me think 
you have failed to grasp the gravity of the Holocaust.
Sachs: My agenda isn’t about making a point about the 
Holocaust. I don’t think any of the artists in the show 
are trying to make a point about the Holocaust. We’re 
mostly in our 30’s and 40’s, and we have a certain 
distance from those events …
Q: So what are your aims as an artist?
Sachs: My main interest is bricolage … (Solomon New York 
Times 10 March 2002).
On one level of interpretation, Sachs’s work seems to commentate 
on precisely the same ‘frenzy of consumption’ that Watson identified 
as analogous with genocide. And yet the main critical and public 
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response to Sachs’s work was that is suffered from the ‘delusional 
intellectual pretension’ that characterised the worst in Holocaust 
art; Sachs was in large part responsible for reviews dismissing the 
entire show as ‘an emergency ward for toxic narcissism’ (Schjeldahl 
2002: 87), ‘sheer stupidity’ and ‘not to be forgiven’ (Kramer 2002). 
The show’s curator, Norman L. Kleeblatt, admitted the capacity for 
‘Nazi-era images to probe issues at the center of prevailing cultural 
and aesthetic discourses, among them desire, commodification, 
and spectatorship’ (2002b: 15 emphasis added). And Jean-Pierre 
Geuens rejected imposing limitations upon Holocaust representation, 
writing ‘the wounds should be repeatedly and mercilessly stabbed 
open with a knife for the Holocaust to remain the mirror that truly 
defines our limits’ (1995-6: 127). It isn’t certain that Sachs’s work 
meets Geuens’s challenge; dismantling a Prada hatbox to explore 
one’s interest in fashion, commodity fetishism and bricolage seems 
a considerably lower aim than the merciless self-examination that 
Geuens demands. Much more needs to be said about precisely what 
we can learn about desire or commodification from the Holocaust 
before Sachs is acquitted of accusations that he is ‘facile’ (Saltzman 
2002: 94). It is not that these conversations cannot take place, nor that 
the Holocaust can teach us only about atrocity, terror and cruelty. But 
more is required here than the assertion that it can be done. If the 
Holocaust’s crimes teach us nothing else, it is the gravity of pursuing 
the possible simply to explore its possibility. Is it preferable, then, 
to denounce Sachs as a bad artist, or his work as bad art? Theodor 
Adorno warned us about ‘wringing pleasure’ from the Holocaust 
(Geuens 1995-6: 114); to do so would be ‘barbarism’ where aesthetic 
‘success’ would have ‘consequences of its own’, where the audience 
could ‘transcend the horror’ and recognise the ‘greatness’ of the art 
(Geuens 1995-6: 114). Is it possible — is it responsible — to make 
great art about the Holocaust?
A more fundamental question is this: Should anyone make art 
about the Holocaust? Is this a crime scene that ought not to be visually 
represented? Are the crimes that occurred here unimaginable? At the 
ultimate limits of Holocaust representation is silence. From different 
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perspectives but for related reasons, a large number of critical scholars 
echo the call for silence: Berel Lang wrote that any representation 
of the Holocaust ‘must be judged against the criterion of respectful 
silence that should be our first response to it’ (in White 1992: 43). 
For George Steiner, ‘the world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it 
lies outside reason’ (in Geuens 1995-6: 115). Irving Howe feared that 
any representation of the Shoah would ‘domesticate it, rendering it 
familiar and in some sense even tolerable’ (in Geuens 1995-6: 115). Elie 
Wiesel stated that ‘Auschwitz negates all literature’ (in Geuens 1995-6: 
115). Michael André Bernstein preferred ‘thematically weighted and 
deliberately chosen silence as the only ethically unsullied response that 
art can make to the Shoah’ (1994: 43). By remaining silent, we avoid 
diminishing ourselves by engaging in discourse with depravity. But 
precisely what is the responsibility of the silent subject? Does silence 
require us to draw privately upon our reserve of conscience and just feel 
bad? Or does silence permit us to forget about it, move on, sail forward 
into the world deaf to the clamouring of history, exploring whole new 
oceans of atrocity? What does silence say?
Susan Sontag traced the changing significance of silence as a tool 
in artistic representation. Silence functioned as ‘a zone of meditation’, 
or an ‘ambivalence about making contact with the audience’ (1976: 6), 
or a decision (as in the suicide of the artist), or a punishment (as in the 
madness of the artist), or effected through censorship, destruction of 
artworks, exile. Sontag identified a tenacious refusal to take seriously 
the quest for silence: ‘The art of our time is noisy with appeals for silence. 
… One recognizes the imperative of silence, but goes on speaking 
anyway. Discovering that one has nothing to say, one seeks a way 
to say that ’ (1976: 12). Berel Lang conceded the same condition, the 
impossibility of silence, despite its utter appropriateness: ‘all claims … 
on the unspeakable that cover also the indescribable, the unthinkable, 
the unimaginable, the incredible — come embedded in yards of writing 
that attempt to overcome the inadequacy of language in representing 
moral enormity at the same time that they assert its presence’ (2000: 
18). For Lang, silence remains as the measure of articulation: ‘whatever 
is written ought to be justifiable as more probative, more incisive, 
236
Biber
more revealing, than its absence or, more cruelly, its erasure’ (2000: 
18). But the oppressive potential of systematised silence must not 
go unchallenged. Bernstein argued that the refusal to represent the 
Shoah is ‘a far more menacing position’ (1994: 4). Being forbidden from 
representing it transforms silence into a disciplinary tool of terror. 
Because, of course, all silence speaks. And, in the case of the Final 
Solution, there are no inadvertent omissions.
The difficulty with any measure, the futility in exercising judgment 
or choice, lies in locating the limits, the boundaries, of the representable. 
Everywhere we are cautioned against crossing the line, but nowhere 
is it possible to perceive where the line is drawn. Susan Sontag, seeing 
photographs taken after the liberation of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau, 
experienced the transgression of a hitherto-unknown limit: ‘When 
I looked at those photographs, something broke. Some limit had been 
reached ’ (1977: 19-20 emphasis added). The inability to articulate 
precisely when the limit has been reached was echoed by Andreas 
Huyssen, who claimed that the question is ‘to be decided case by case’ 
(2000: 29). Berel Lang cautioned us against engaging in rhetorical 
boundary skirmishes about limits. He wrote: ‘One could imagine here 
the inversion of a Kafkaesque tale in which the existence of a limit was 
proclaimed but what it ‘limited’ or excluded was left unstated’ (Lang 
2000: 66). In Lang’s tale, the antihero grows increasingly obsessed and 
paranoid, and ‘even his largest excesses fail to bring him into contact 
with the limit’ (Lang 2000: 66).
The first and the most regularly invoked of the limits to Holocaust 
representation is a sense of responsibility to its victims. When the artist 
Bruce Nauman was asked in 1992 to design a Holocaust memorial for 
Hanover, he proposed a sign that read: ‘We are sorry for what we did, 
and we promise not to do it again’. For art critic Peter Schjeldahl, this 
sentence represented the limits of speech for Holocaust perpetrators. 
Beyond an apology and an assurance, perpetrators cannot speak; 
‘Whatever else might be said has belonged to the victims’ (Schjeldahl 
2002). In Mirroring Evil, the Israeli artist Boaz Arad transforms 
apology into art. Having trawled film and sound archives of Hitler’s 
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propaganda speeches, he edited together ‘Hebrew Lesson’ (2000), a 
film that shows Adolf Hitler saying, in Hebrew, “Greetings Jerusalem, 
I apologise” (“Shalom Yerushalayim, Ani mitnatzel”).2 The stilted 
footage repeats itself; the apology is re-stated seven times, enabling 
the viewer gradually to comprehend the initially inaudible message. 
Some viewers reported that they could never make out the message, 
and —consequently — that Hitler had failed to learn his lesson (Ray 
2005: 121-134).
Centering the victim in Holocaust discourse is impossible without 
also addressing the perpetrator; one does not stand in Holocaust 
discourse unaccompanied by the other. Arad’s film takes the artist 
and the viewer towards the perpetrator position. The catalogue entry 
describes how Arad, in the meticulous process of editing the footage, 
‘has become intimate with Hitler, deeply familiar with his words, his 
inflections’ and yet how, through the project, ‘he is able to exert power 
over the Führer and manipulate him, using the same propaganda 
films that Hitler used to exert power over the German public’ (JL in 
Kleeblatt 2002a: 121-122). This catalogue description suggests that 
the exhibition’s curators have conflated artistic choice with genocidal 
intent, claiming some kind of equivalence of power between artist and 
Führer. It is this article’s argument that the fundamental problem in 
the debate over visually representing the Holocaust is the mistaken 
claim to equivalence or resemblance — the mirroring of evil in art. 
Art may show evil, but it is not implicitly capable of evil. Both may 
be wrong, but they are not examples of the same wrongness. They 
operate in separate registers and need to be assessed on their own 
terms. A video artist in Israel wields none of the power exercised 
by Adolf Hitler. Nor does he seek to do so. To say that the artistic 
process has made the artist Hitler’s ‘intimate’, to say that Arad now 
‘exert[s] power over the Führer’, is the kind of specious curatorial 
blather that warrants the kind of critical sanction that followed the 
opening of Mirroring Evil. As this article’s opening epigraph (by 
Elvis Costello) asserts, each representation has its ‘proper place’ and 
it is our duty to put it in its place; whilst things may fall out of their 
place, there is also a limit which they must never transgress. Here, 
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this is the point where art itself becomes an act of depravity: making 
lampshades from the skin of one’s victims.
Whilst Arad’s film achieves its subversive intent, and also its 
demand that the viewer decide whether or not it is possible to forgive 
Hitler, it (more so than the catalogue entry describing it) remains aware 
of the dangers of occupying the perpetrator position. The impossibility 
of representing Holocaust crimes without dealing with the perpetrators 
is the point of much of the art of Anselm Keifer. Writing about the 
‘transcendence’ made possible by Keifer’s photographs of himself 
saluting before German national monuments, James R. Watson 
wrote, ‘Keifer’s point is that there is no art undertaking which does 
not partake of that which it critiques’, and that ‘No representational 
medium can be used after Auschwitz that does not somehow bear the 
traces of the transformative event’ (1992: 178, 179). This is despite 
Bruno Bettelheim’s warning that any attempt to come close to the 
perpetrator may lead us to an ‘understanding’ that ‘may come close to 
forgiving’; he wrote, ‘I believe there are acts so vile that our task is to 
reject and prevent them, not to try to understand them empathetically’ 
(in Browning 1992: 35-6). Christopher Browning (1992: 36) refused 
to accept that understanding can be conf lated with forgiveness. 
Nevertheless, our responsibility to the victim is negotiated through our 
refusal to allow the perpetrator to speak, except in the most limited 
terms. In Arad’s work, the perpetrator’s voice is halting, stuttering, 
and his gestures unnatural. It clearly performs the precarious balance 
that makes the suffering of the victims available without making the 
perpetrator’s position inhabitable.
Saul Friedlander speculated that we have set representational 
limits that arise from the arbitrary historical outcome that the 
Nazis were defeated. He asked, ‘what would have happened if the 
Nazis had won the war? No doubt there would have been a plethora 
of pastoral emplotments of life in the Third Reich and of comic 
emplotments of the disappearance of its victims’ (1992b: 10). The 
work of Israeli artist Roee Rosen in Mirroring Evil enters this terrain. 
His installation, ‘Live and Die as Eva Braun’ (1995) is a book of 60 
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black-and-white drawings in various genres and media, frequently 
using the conventions of children’s book illustration, illustrating 
the life and death of Braun. The catalogue entry states, ‘She [Eva] 
shares intimacies that are at once naïve, titillating, and vulgar. At 
every turn, the narrative is accompanied by drawings that mirror its 
paradoxical juncture between naïveté and pornography’ (NLK in 
Kleeblatt 2002a: 101). Rosen’s work, for his exploration of perpetrator 
psychology, saw him denounced as a Holocaust ‘relativiser’, and an 
earlier exhibition of this piece in the Israel Museum in 1997 led to 
the Israeli Minister for Education to call for its closure. International 
media reports challenged Rosen’s use of sexualised imagery, its sense 
of intimacy with Braun, and accusations that his work was gratuitous, 
sensational or pornographic. The curator of Mirroring Evil, however, 
suggested that Rosen’s position ‘possessed greater “legitimacy” than 
many because he is the son of a Holocaust survivor’ (NLK in Kleeblatt 
2002a: 101); this logic is widely debated and disputed amongst Israeli 
Jews, diaspora Jews, and gentiles: that surviving the Holocaust confers 
extra entitlements. Rosen’s aim was not to claim such ‘legitimacy’ 
for his contentious artwork; his aim was, in part, to confront a long-
standing Israeli cultural proscription against visually representing the 
Holocaust. More recently, Ari Libsker’s documentary film Stalags: 
Holocaust and Pornography in Israel (2007) reveals that there was, in the 
early 1960s, an underground publishing phenomenon in Israel, known 
as ‘stalags’, where the Holocaust and Nazi themes were portrayed in 
pornographic modes. Libsker’s film posits that this was the first form 
of locally-produced pornography in Israel, and the creator of the series 
attributed their motivation and popularity to the public interest in 
the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 (Kershner 2007). 
‘Live and Die as Eva Braun’ does not represent Jews, or indeed any 
Nazi victims, and contains none of the themes of victimisation and 
memorialisation apparent in Holocaust memorials created by other 
Israeli artists. Most seriously, however, it seems Rosen’s offence was 
not only his choice to represent the perpetrator perspective, but also 
his imaginative departure from the historical record.
Whereas artists are generally free to exercise creative and 
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imaginative powers, they will confront a strictly-guarded disciplinary 
(and ethical) boundary when they make art about historical events and, 
especially, art about Holocaust crimes. Unlike artists, historians remain 
committed to finding ways of accommodating the Holocaust within 
existing historiographical limitations. For Christopher Browning, the 
distinction between ‘indisputable fact’ and ‘falsification’ requires our 
consideration of the ‘degree of plausibility’ of a claim, whether it is 
‘more or less coherent and persuasive’ (1992: 33). Whilst he stated that 
‘archetypal cases [of fact or falsification] seem obvious’, for ‘borderline 
cases’, he conceded, ‘I do not know’ (1992: 33). Perry Anderson was 
more certain: ‘absolute limits are set by the evidence’, and ‘exterior limits’ 
prevent outright denial of the Holocaust or other ‘counterfactuals’ 
(1992: 64). Hayden White wrote, ‘the facts of the matter set limits 
on the kinds of stories that can be properly … told’ (1992: 39). For 
Anderson, ‘narrative strategies, to be credible’ prevent the plotting of 
the Final Solution ‘historically’ in romance or comedy genres (1992: 64). 
For White, ‘comic’ or ‘pastoral’ modes of emplotment are ‘manifestly 
false to the facts — or at least to the facts that matter — of the Nazi 
era’ (1992: 39). In the responsible historiography of the Holocaust, 
ethical representation requires close adherence to the facts. Hayden 
White said that ethics determines ‘unacceptable modes of emplotment’ 
(1992: 38), unacceptable because ‘they offended against morality or 
taste’ (1992: 40-41). These positions suggest that, epistemologically 
speaking, Holocaust questions are settled. Holocaust representations, 
it follows, ought to hold close to the known facts. But knowing all the 
facts raises the difficulty of finding new ways of re-telling a story whose 
conclusion is well-known.
Michael André Bernstein, arguing against the narrative tendency 
to ‘foreshadow’ the doom that concludes so many Holocaust narratives, 
wrote that these texts should resist being ‘monuments of inevitability’ 
(1994: 4), reliant upon ‘the necessary importation of our knowledge about 
the Shoah’ (1994: 61). This suggests either that we shouldn’t allow what 
we already know to operate upon us as we approach a representation, 
or else that we needn’t know anything to begin to think about the 
Holocaust. Is it possible — is it responsible — to approach the Holocaust 
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in innocence, or with an open mind? If visually representing Holocaust 
crimes requires an imaginative enterprise, how does one unleash one’s 
imagination within tight factually-confined limits?
Andreas Huyssen argued against our limiting the language 
or genres through which the Holocaust may be spoken. If, as he 
claimed, it is our ‘responsibility to prevent forgetting’, then it may 
be appropriate when addressing post-Holocaust generations to admit 
‘melodramatic soap opera’ and the ‘fictionalized’ and ‘emotionalized’ 
narratives of prime time television (1995: 256). He argued, ‘If the 
Holocaust can be compared to an earthquake that has destroyed all 
the instruments for measuring it, as Lyotard has suggested, then 
surely there must be more than one way of representing it’ (1995: 
256). The artists represented in Mirroring Evil, whilst diverse in 
their aims and methods, share one common feature. Rather than 
addressing themselves to a nominal, abstracted, historical Holocaust 
victim, requiring the ethical duty of responsibility and respect, they 
address a contemporary art viewer. Each of these artists tries to affect 
their audience, and their audience is presumed to be historically 
knowledgeable, culturally sophisticated and — and this is the 
troubling quality — preoccupied with their personal worries and 
bored with old routines. This audience, these artists presume, needs 
to be shocked into remembrance. New horrors need to be introduced 
to remind us that Holocaust crimes remain horrifying.
The demand to create a new visual repertoire returns us to one of 
the Holocaust’s earliest representational crises: the challenge to achieve 
judicial proof of its crimes; the challenge of law. Law’s first response 
to Holocaust crimes was to open itself up to the imaginative register, 
acknowledging the simultaneously probative and shocking power of 
images. Prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal knew that existing 
modes of representation were insufficient for adducing and proving 
Holocaust crimes; as Lawrence Douglas wrote, ‘the law had to locate 
an adequate idiom of both representation and judgment’ (1995: 453). 
For Douglas, the Tribunal’s role was to ‘demonstrate law’s power to 
reintroduce its ordering effects … into a space of spectacular excess and 
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egregious lawlessness’ (1995: 463). Because the crimes addressed were 
literally unprecedented, the Tribunal admitted new types of evidence 
— visual evidence — invoking the necessity ‘to translate images of 
atrocity into a discourse of illegality’ (1995: 457). Speaking particularly 
about the screening of the documentary film Nazi Concentration Camps, 
Douglas wrote that, by offering ‘visual proof of astonishing atrocities’, 
the evidence was persuasive for its ‘symbolic content’, and not any direct 
or conventional probative value (2001: 294). As Douglas identified, 
evidence of atrocity was admitted out of ‘law’s need to justify its own 
beleaguered normativity’ (2001: 294).
Screening the documentary at Nuremberg, as well as tendering as 
exhibits flayed human skin covered in tattoos, and a shrunken head 
(the head of a Polish prisoner, the skull removed, shrunk, stuffed and 
preserved by the Buchenwald camp commandant as a grotesque curio 
for his wife), tested the limits of law. These items were evidence not of 
any direct legal guilt of the defendants. Instead they proved barbarity, 
depravity; as Douglas argued, they were evidence of ‘crimes of atavism: 
horrific deeds committed in an orgy of mass savagery and lawlessness’ 
(2001: 278). The challenge for law was the reassertion of civilisation, 
order and control into a space where primitivism went unsanctioned. 
Douglas wrote, ‘by serving as an icon of atavism, the shrunken head 
presented an image of atrocity familiar to liberal jurisprudence: of the 
law as civilization’s bulwark against barbarism’ (2001: 279). Whilst 
observers recoiled at the wrongness of this object, including its 
wrongness as an evidentiary exhibit, it was not as if head-shrinking 
was unknowable to civil society, or even to this court; Douglas tells 
us that its English Chief Justice, Geoffrey Lawrence, was elevated to 
England’s High Court in 1932, the year that Oxford University, his 
alma mater, acquired two shrunken heads from the Jivaro of Equador. 
Postcards of these exhibits are still available today from the gift shop. 
Jivaro methods were said to have been studied by Nazi head shrinkers 
(Douglas 2001: 279). The point was that this civil society, this court, 
refused to tolerate the barbarism of the defendants, people who should 




The Tribunal, at this early stage, was drawing a distinction that had 
begun to disappear by the time of the Mirroring Evil exhibition: the 
distinction between wrong-doing and wrong-showing. This distinction 
was easily apparent to two of the defendants at Nuremberg. Of Field 
Marshal Keitel, Douglas wrote that, upon seeing the shrunken head 
presented to the court, ‘Keitel, himself no stranger to brutal behavior, 
whispered “Furchtbar! Furchtbar!” – Horrible! Horrible!’ (2001: 280-
281). Hermann Goering’s response to the screening of the documentary 
was to say ‘And then they showed that awful film, and it just spoiled 
everything’ (Douglas 1995: 449). Goering’s comment here suggests 
that, quite apart from his culpability in mass crimes, there is an implicit 
wrongness in exhibition. The documentary film and the shrunken 
head highlight the distinction between evidence of legal guilt and 
evidence that evokes visceral responses, independently of legal guilt. 
The Holocaust’s crimes inaugurated horror as a new legal category. As 
United States prosecutor Robert Jackson stated at Nuremberg, ‘These 
are things which have turned the stomach of the world’ (Douglas 
2001: 282). For this reason these artefacts, although not probative 
of the crimes in issue, were given the status of legal evidence. Such 
evidence must have been lawful because it was disgusting. Law became 
the institutional process by which our disgust was classified, codified, 
given a vocabulary; from the pit of our stomach emerged a system of 
revulsion, a capacity for articulating visceral judgment. The disturbing 
exhibition, the visually-wrong representations, needed to be absorbed 
within the legal limits if law’s ordering capacity was to continue to 
function. Far from expelling abject imagery, law brought it within its 
own jurisdiction.
Alison Young (2000), looking at the relationship between law 
and ‘transgressive’ art, explored the emergence of a jurisprudence of 
disgust, in particular, law’s capacity to sanction ‘disgusting’ visual 
representations. Introducing the concept of ‘aesthetic vertigo’, she 
considered whether this sensation has the capacity to destabilise law, 
or whether it can be corrected through legal judgment and repression 
(Young 2000: 261). To consider that law has a relationship with disgust, 
that each has the capacity for conversation with the other, requires the 
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articulation of limits beyond which they do not engage. In the case of 
law and art, Young suggested that each may be testing the limitations of 
the other. Whereas law tends only to respond to art when so provoked, 
art — and artists — may engage in willful and deliberate testing of 
law’s limits.
In response to provocative art, law embraced the category of 
‘obscenity’ through which it could regulate artistic productions that 
are disgusting; but identifying obscenity always involves a degree of 
judgment. Lynda Nead wrote, ‘obscenity’s beginning is art’s end; art 
starts where obscenity terminates’ (1999: 205-6). Policing the boundary 
is law. The distinction was articulated by Harper J in the Australian 
obscenity case in which the Archbishop of Melbourne sought an 
injunction against the exhibition of Andres Serrano’s ‘Piss Christ’: Pell 
v Council of the Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria:
[There has been no] assumption by me of the role of art critic. It would 
not merely be presumptuous, but quite wrong, of me to attempt any 
such thing. It is not relevant to my task and it would take the court 
into places in which it has no business to be. There is much wisdom 
… in the words of Landau J, the Israeli judge who presided over the 
trial of Adolf Eichmann. The courts, he said, speak with an authority 
whose very weight depends upon its limitations. No-one has made us 
judges of matters outside the realm of law (at 392-3).
It is significant that, in stating that law has places of business and 
places where it has no business, Harper J refers to a landmark example 
of transgression and law’s attempt to deal with it: Holocaust. Citing 
Landau J in this context is intended to add incontrovertible legitimacy 
to Harper J’s claim that law recognises limits; indeed, law is rendered 
possible and effective only because of its recognition of those limits. 
Art, by this argument, is separate from law and legal regulation until 
it becomes obscene. When it transgresses this boundary, it is brought 
within the governance of law; obscenity becomes law’s responsibility.
But, for Young, the categories of ‘art ’ and ‘obscenity’ are 
‘irrevocably insinuated’ (2000: 250). And for certain artistic practices, 
it is the deliberate intention of the artist to insinuate one within the 
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other. Artists like Serrano aspire to more than ‘the simple shudder 
of revulsion’ in response to their art, ‘desiring instead the full weight 
of censure from the paternal Law’ (Young 2000: 262). Young wrote, 
‘Abjection — in its requirement that the disgusting object be expelled, 
outlawed and repressed — demands a regulatory responsiveness in 
the subject’ (2000: 262). By invoking law to take responsibility for 
regulating artistic work, artists attempt to expand the limits of both 
art and law, but to what end? Is it to enable repression, or to expose 
the repressive capacities of law? For Susan Sontag, it is the ‘chronic 
habit’ of contemporary art to displease, provoke or frustrate; but, as 
an actual practice, the regularity of its violations become anticipated, 
even accommodated: ‘the artist’s transgression becomes ingratiating, 
eventually legitimate’ (Sontag 1976: 7). This is apparent when, in the 
Director’s Preface to the Mirroring Evil exhibition catalogue, Joan 
Rosenbaum referred to the artworks as ‘transgressive’, ‘difficult, 
challenging’, ‘provocative and troubling’, positively inviting responses 
predicated upon disgust (2002: viii).
Contemporary notions of art suggest that art transcends all limits, 
that it defies all attempts to impose upon it responsibilities to anything, 
including to notions of aesthetic beauty. For Berel Lang, ‘art appears 
here as independent of history, weightless, untouched by motive, cause, 
or purpose’ (2000: 160-161). This view of art suggests that art can do 
anything, but that we can do nothing about it. Art’s autonomy from 
moral discourse means that, for Lang, in the context of ‘Holocaust 
images’, special and serious attention is needed (2000: 164-166). Lang 
identifies four different representational transgressions: (1) impossible 
and unimaginable, (2) imaginable but impossible, (3) unimaginable 
but possible, (4) imaginable and possible (2000: 54-55). It is the fourth 
position that is the source of our enduring trouble; for Lang, it is here 
that ‘the conception of limits as moral comes fully into view’ (2000: 57). 
We are given a moral responsibility to observe certain boundaries when 
we seek to represent atrocities that are both possible and imaginable. 
But the actual requirements for moral conduct are never articulated 
explicitly. As Saul Friedlander observed, transgressions are identified 
through ‘a kind of uneasiness’ (1992b: 3-4).
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Nazism is ‘an unlimited field for a surge of the imagination, for a 
use of aesthetic effects, for a demonstration of literary brilliance and 
the power of one’s intellect’ (Friedlander 1984: 20). But, whilst it may 
inspire a ‘masterpiece’, it inspires also a feeling that it is ‘tuned in the 
wrong key’, that ‘some kind of limit has been overstepped’ and we have 
moved into a ‘new discourse’ (Friedlander 1984: 21). There is no clearly-
drawn boundary, no black letter of law, just the expectation that we will 
shudder, and from this shudder will flow an act of responsibility. What 
makes for ‘good’ Holocaust art? Is it a matter of aesthetic judgment, 
or is it whatever makes us shudder? And, where certain Holocaust 
images come to achieve the status of ‘icons’ (Brink 2000: 137), or 
‘clichés’ (Hirsch 2001: 5, Huyssen 1995: 255), or ‘kitsch’ (Friedlander 
1984: 27), are newer and more destabilising representations justified 
for getting a now-jaded audience to shudder?
Looking at the Mirroring Evil exhibition, James E. Young asked, 
‘Just what are the limits of taste and irony here?’ (2002: xvi). Michael 
André Bernstein argued that there are artistic or literary representations 
of the Shoah that are ‘deeply offensive’ because they are characterised 
by ‘tastelessness’, ‘vulgarity’ and ‘exploitation’ (1994: 52). That taste 
becomes a term of judgment indicates a conflation of artistic standards 
with moral ones. But it is not a moral judgment that proscribes; to say 
that a representation is in bad taste does not argue for its elimination 
or prohibition. Instead it ranks the representation in a hierarchical 
structure that reflects bourgeois social standards, where representations 
in bad taste appear beneath those that are in better taste. It suggests, 
also, that it is possible to imagine a representation that is in impeccable 
taste, flawlessly turned out. And a representation of the Holocaust that 
is tasteful is likely flawed for that very reason.
As Omer Bartov (1996) warned, even tasteful representation 
carries with it the mendacious potential for voyeurism, the dangerous 
pleasure that describes our fascination. Bartov identified the source of 
his unease in the ‘obsession, with perversity and obscenity, inhumanity 
and criminality, aggression and horror’; but the viewing position is 
not rampantly depraved; instead its combines ‘cool aesthetic pleasure’ 
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and ‘mild nausea’, responding to representations that are ‘attractive, 
stimulating, interesting’ (1996: 116). Our ‘obsession with fascism’, he 
cautions, bears an ‘uncanny resemblance’ to the phenomenon itself 
(Bartov 1996: 116). It is this uncanny resemblance that seems to be 
encapsulated in the title of Mirroring Evil. But it is crucial to remember 
— and it is the central argument of this article — that fascinations with 
fascism, wringing artistically-provocative pleasures from Holocaust 
crimes — are not, in themselves, criminal acts. Whilst they may seem 
wrong or bad, they are not criminally so, and share no equivalence — 
they do not bear an uncanny resemblance — to acts of genocide.
The long-prevailing view, that the uniqueness of the Holocaust 
imposes special limits upon its representation, has begun to yield to 
another view, which sees those limits stretching with the passage 
of time. Saul Friedlander noted that ‘we are confronted with the 
two sides of Hitler: that of yesterday and that of today’ (1984: 72). 
Yesterday’s account is reliant upon ‘facts’ and ‘reality’; today we 
wrangle with ‘reinterpretation’ and ‘aestheticization’ (Friedlander 
1984: 72). Further, the period immediately after the Allied liberation 
of the camps gave Holocaust representations the capacity to shock 
because of the element of surprise, a capacity that with their repetition 
over time may have worn away. Writing about the screening of the 
documentary at Nuremberg, Lawrence Douglas pointed out, ‘The 
horror captured in Nazi Concentration Camps is by now so familiar that 
it is difficult to imagine an original screening — that is, a screening 
that shocks not simply because of the barbarity of the images, but also 
because of their novelty’ (1995: 464). The film, he argued, provided 
a ‘visual register of atrocity’ where previously there had been none, 
‘cross[ing] a threshold of representation from which there was no 
turning back’ (1995: 464). Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi also identified 
Nuremberg as a turning point in Holocaust representation. Whilst 
for many years certain types of representation were ‘unthinkable’, the 
post-war trials, beginning with the International Military Tribunal, 
rendered the barbarity ‘performative’, gradually enabling Nazism to 




But whilst, for Ezrahi, these representations are to be congratulated 
for their ‘courageous self-examination and self-exposure’ (2002: 19), 
Susan Sontag cautioned us against giving in to the enduring fascination 
with fascism. When the artist Robert Morris posed in Nazi gear for an 
exhibition poster, he is said to have done so on the grounds that it is ‘the 
only image that still has any power to shock’, relegating Nazism to some 
back-catalogue of all-purpose icons (Sontag 1980b: 101). As a view of 
art, Sontag suggested, it conformed to the quest for ‘ever-fresh gestures 
of provocation’ (1980b: 101). As a view of society, it failed to address 
the mendacious allure of fascism, both aesthetically and politically 
(Sontag 1980b: 101). Her warning reminds us that novelty and shock 
value cannot be confined to the aesthetic context; any representation 
that uses fascism must, of necessity, commentate also on the operation 
of power and terror in fascist practices. That Nazi imagery is capable 
of teaching us about art says something far more troubling about the 
socio-cultural milieu in which repression, cruelty and mass murder 
have independent value as aesthetic iconography.
The curator of Mirroring Evil, Norman L. Kleeblatt, admitted, ‘most 
ideological boundaries — especially those regarding representation 
— have a way of dissolving with time. What has seemed shocking, 
transgressive, or inappropriate in one decade becomes normalized by 
repeating exposure and by distance’ (2002b: 11). Susan Sontag wrote 
that, in liberal societies, that which has been ‘hitherto unmentionable’ 
may be rehabilitated smoothly: ‘It is not that Reifenstahl’s Nazi past 
has suddenly become acceptable. It is simply that, with the turn of the 
cultural wheel, it no longer matters. … [A] liberal society settles such 
questions by waiting for cycles of taste to distill out the controversy’ 
(Sontag 1980b: 83-84). Again: taste. And, in the case of Holocaust 
representation, there are those who take an orthodox position (that 
which promotes respect for victims and survivors as the primary 
consideration) who accept that the current ‘cycle’ of Holocaust 
representation will roll forward when the last of the survivors is dead. 
With the dying out of this generation, Peter Schjeldahl lamented that 
‘both direct responsibility and proprietary grievance regarding the 
Holocaust are expiring like patents, and the business of reflecting on 
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it has become a free-for-all’ (2002: 97).
Sontag made an additional claim for context:
The hard truth is that what may be acceptable in elite culture may not 
be acceptable in mass culture, that tastes which pose only innocuous 
ethical issues, as the property of a minority become corrupting when 
they become more established. Taste is context, and the context has 
changed (1980b: 97).
The crucial point about context is that the imposition of a single, 
official, orthodox or respectful standard to Holocaust representation 
nudges perilously close to those repressive practices that enabled the 
Holocaust in the first instance. As Saul Friedlander wrote:
Jean-Francois Lyotard takes “Auschwitz” as a reference to demonstrate 
the impossibility of any single, integrated discourse about history and 
politics. The voices of the perpetrators and those of the victims are 
fundamentally heterogeneous and mutually exclusive. The striving 
for totality and consensus is, in Lyotard’s view, the very basis of the 
fascist enterprise (1992b: 5).
Similarly, Michael André Bernstein wrote:
The freedom to choose — one’s own philosophy, faith, communal 
affiliation, and historical sense, as well as one’s mode of remembering 
and representing that memory — is precisely what Nazism made 
impossible for Jews, and although the affirmation of that freedom can 
do nothing for the victims of the Shoah, it is the only coherent rejection 
of the Nazi principle of nondifferentiation among Jews (1994: 44).
William Ian Miller’s argument is that the singularity of the 
speaking position arises not politically (as fascism), nor discursively (as 
history), nor morally (as judgment). For Miller it is visceral, derived 
from a shared sense of disgust. He wrote:
The avowal of disgust expects concurrence. … Disgust has … powerful 
communalizing capacities and is especially useful and necessary as 
a builder of moral and social community. It performs this function 
obviously by helping define and locate the boundary separating our 




Just as a Holocaust representation must decide for itself whether to 
conform or confront, so too must the audience of these representations 
ask itself the question: why am I looking at this? For viewers, there is 
an important distinction between the quest for moral knowledge, on 
the one hand, and the compulsion to fascination and curiosity, on the 
other. Lawrence Douglas compared the punishment of witnessing that 
was imposed upon civilians who lived near concentration camps with 
the experience of watching a documentary such as Nazi Concentration 
Camps. He wrote, ‘If we think of the act of viewing as a sanction, 
then the film seems to impose virtually the same punishment upon 
us’ (1995:472). Why do we watch Holocaust documentaries or feature 
films? Why do we attend exhibitions of artworks about the Shoah? Is 
this an act of punishment or pleasure, or an entangled combination 
of the two? In what ways are we different from people who enjoy 
watching ‘brutalities, perversions, pain, and rape’? (Bartov 1996: 128) 
What does it mean that we have gone to the cinema or the museum 
to look at the Holocaust?
The central contemporary question about Holocaust representation 
transforms the viewer into the subject of the work: What effect does 
it have upon me? Susan Sontag cautioned against being fascinated or 
titillated by representations of fascism. She referred to the ‘definitely 
sexual lure of fascism’ (1980b: 101) and displays of atrocity that risk 
being ‘tacitly pornographic’ (1980c: 139). Further, she warned that 
repeated exposure to images of atrocity, like acquired familiarity 
with pornography, had the effect of reducing ‘shock’ and ‘making the 
horrible seem more ordinary’ (1977: 20). Dan Stone wrote that, without 
historical information to contextualise imagery of the Holocaust, it 
descends into a ‘pornography of violence’ (2001: 141). The German 
artist Gerhard Richter asked ‘whether the popular dissemination of 
Holocaust images amounted to a new, respectable kind of pornography’; 
he posed the question: ‘Where is the line between the historically 
inquiring and the erotically preoccupied gaze?’ (in Young 2002: 
xvii). These views locate pornography as the opposite of responsible 
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representation. They state that, when Holocaust imagery crosses this line 
we have gone too far.
For Jean-Pierre Geuens (1995-96), however, pornography 
performs precisely the transgression that Holocaust representation 
requires. His essay discusses a group of pornographic films set in 
concentration camps where female camp internees are sexually 
exploited by SS officer; films with titles like Nazi Love Camp #27, 
Deported Women of the SS Special Sections, SS Hell Camp. Geuens 
argued that the films, themselves part of a much larger genre of 
‘Holocaust porn’ or ‘Nazisploitation’ films which include such titles 
as Ilsa, She-Wolf of the SS and Gestapo’s Last Orgy, ‘fall short’ because 
‘they truly do not measure up to the situation’ (1995-96: 126). The 
subject, he claimed, ‘asked for a unique vision’ which these films, by 
confining themselves within anticipated pornographic conventions, 
failed to fulfil (Geuens 1995-96: 126). These films ought to have 
‘transgress[ed] the good conscience that permeates, for instance, the 
ending of Schindler’s List, where the colorful closure of the “good” 
people alive today permits us to relegate the darkness that preceded 
to an aberration of history’ (Geuens 1995-96: 126). Concentration 
camp porn, Geuens insisted, needs to destroy the ‘cordons sanitaires 
that society erects to protect us from being soiled by the stench and 
the excrescence of the camps’ (1995-96: 127). This may be acceptable 
if it is the purpose of pornography and its consumers to engage in 
a discourse about the Holocaust. But if the pornographic enterprise 
relies upon an arbitrary context in which sexual gratification is played 
out, then Holocaust becomes a ‘setting’, a crime ‘scene’; nothing more.
However, something else, something more than a crime scene, 
seems to be behind apocryphal claims, probably initiated by Andrea 
Dworkin (1990), that there is a Holocaust porn industry based in 
Israel, making films and magazines for the Israeli Jewish market. 
For Dworkin, the pornographic genre permitted power — including 
sexual power — to be reclaimed by victims who had survived, in 
order to themselves become victimisers (part of her larger critique of 
the Israeli state). Joshua Cohen, accepting Dworkin’s claims that this 
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industry existed, wrote that this is where ‘things get dirty’ (2003). 
This is because, regardless of the veracity of Dworkin’s claims, they 
fit easily into Berel Lang’s transgressive representational register as 
both imaginable and possible. And they provide the necessary shock 
that motivates the contemporary viewer to experience Holocaust 
crimes with an intensity that would otherwise, with the passage of 
time, fade.
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, in her catalogue essay from the Mirroring 
Evil exhibition, imagined the effect of transgressive Holocaust 
representations as a lingering spectre tugging at our psyche:
And we, the audience, straighten a skirt here, a tie there, and prepare 
to exit. But as we are about to leave, perhaps – just perhaps — an 
invisible hand grips our throat and we realize that something of these 
acts of impersonation will continue to haunt us even into the sunshine 
of a world after Auschwitz (2002: 35, using metaphor from a poem by 
Wisława Szymborska).
Lawrence Douglas wrote that a ‘crisis of representation … has 
come to characterise efforts to find an idiom capable of capturing the 
Holocaust’s central horror’ (1995: 452). Introducing the documentary 
film into evidence at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson said, ‘Our proof 
will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep’ 
(in Douglas: 1995: 450). It seems necessary to locate Holocaust 
representation within a discourse of disgust, because it may be the 
only way out of the sense of profound pointlessness that comes from 
strolling through a gallery and thinking about the Holocaust. Passive 
reflection on atrocity has no function; it makes no contribution to 
knowledge, it isn’t original or activist or pedagogical. The difference 
is in the pit of the stomach. Looking at art whilst thinking about 
atrocity represents failure in the social subject; looking in disgust seems 
a marginally more productive cultural practice. William Ian Miller 
wrote, ‘Disgust signals our being appalled, signals the fact that we 
are paying more than lip-service; its presence lets us know we are 




Disgust becomes a cultural practice, representing the embodied 
difference between neutral curiosity and something more. For Miller, 
disgust describes ‘our responses to the ordinary vices of hypocrisy, 
betrayal, cruelty, and stupidity’ (1997: 194). But we must be careful 
that we do not impart a kind of equivalence upon these vices. Cruelty 
disgusts us: we condemn it. Stupidity disgusts us, but it is not as bad. 
When we have bad visceral responses to something, we must ensure 
that our sense of nausea does not prevent us from differentiating. To 
think about the shrunken head of Buchenwald invokes a churning in 
the gut; something similar happens when reading an interview with 
Tom Sachs about fashion’s manipulative potential to make us jealous. 
But one of these represents atrocities of dehumanisation, the other 
is a conceptual artist’s failure to think things through. Our ongoing 
responsibility is to remember that, despite our wish to sanction both 
of them, they do not transgress the same limit.
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